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ABSTRACT
The objective of this paper is twofold. First, it identifies and categorizes
the currency crises suffered by Argentina from 1825 to 2002. Second, it looks
for regularities in the behaviour of key macroeconomic variables in the
neighbourhood of crises by means of graphic analysis, non-parametric and
econometric techniques. We found that expansions in public expenditures as
well as increases in the debt to GDP ratio and falls in the rate of growth of
bank deposits contribute to spur the probability of crisis. Unfavourable
external conditions, jointly with domestic imbalances, help to explain very
deep crises or crashes.
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RESUMEN
Este trabajo tiene un doble objetivo. En primer lugar identifica y cate-
goriza las crisis sufridas por Argentina desde 1825 hasta 2002. Con ese
insumo, intenta encontrar regularidades en el comportamiento de variables
macroecono´micas claves en el vecindario de las crisis mediante ana´lisis
gra´fico y me´todos no parame´tricos y parame´tricos. Encontramos que las
expansiones en el gasto pu´blico ası´ como los aumentos en el ratio de deuda
a PIB y las caı´das en la tasa de crecimiento de los depo´sitos bancarios
aumentan las probabilidades de crisis. Los empeoramientos en las con-
diciones externas, conjuntamente con los desajustes dome´sticos, contribuyen
a explicar las crisis muy profundas.
Palabras clave: Argentina, Crisis de Moneda, Ataques Especulativos
1. INTRODUCTION
La crisis actual es la misma de 1870, la de 1865, la de 1860, de la 1852,
de la 1840, etc. El paı´s ha vivido en esas crisis desde que dejo´ de ser
colonia de Espan˜a. Podrı´a decirse que no es econo´mica sino polı´tica y
social. Reside en la falta de cohesio´n y de unidad orga´nica del cuerpo o
agregado social que se denomina Nacio´n Argentina, y no es sino un plan,
un desideratum de nacio´n. La diversidad y lucha de sus instituciones de
cre´dito, la anarquı´a de sus monedas, la emulacio´n enfermiza que preside
a sus gastos dispendiosos en obras concebidas para ganar sufragios y
poder, vienen del estado de descomposicio´n y desarreglo en que se
mantienen las instituciones, los poderes, los intereses del paı´s1.
Juan Bautista Alberdi (1810-1884)2
Social sciences researchers exposed to Argentinean economic history for
the first time are usually surprised by the abrupt changes in its economic
variables3. Those who delve deeper are shocked: some extreme economic
events, like crises, seem to come and go over and over again, creating a sense
1 «This crisis is the same as 1870, 1865, 1860, 1852, 1840 crises. The country has lived in such
crises since its independence from Spain. Arguably, crises are not caused by economic but political
and social factors. They stem from the lack of cohesion and organic unity of the Argentine Nation,
which is just a plan, a desideratum of nation. The diversity and struggle of their credit institutions,
the anarchy of its currencies, its wasteful expenditure designed to get votes and power come from
the state of decomposition and disorder of its institutions, its powers, its common interests»
(authors’ translation).
2 Alberdi is known as the father of the Constitution. This quote was taken from writings
published after his death (Alberdi 1998).
3 As noted by Prebisch (1921) periods of euphoria and unlimited enthusiasm are followed by
frustration and endless delusion without any transition time.
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of deja` vu. Argentina not only had a larger number of crisis years than any
other country, as documented by Eichengreen and Bordo (2002), but also
was the protagonist of some of the most resounding cases of sovereign debt
default in world history such as those in 1827, 1890 and 2002.
The cost of several crises and crashes for Argentina has been huge, not
only in terms of real output losses but also from a socioeconomic viewpoint.
The country has suffered frequent drains on its stock of human capital,
dramatic institutional changes and severe income distribution imbalance. To
give some examples, the latest crash in 2001-2002, known as Tango, brought
about a 15 per cent decrease in real GDP and pushed vast sectors of the
population below the poverty line. Similarly, the 1989 crash, featuring hyper-
inflation, resulted in a 9 per cent collapse in real GDP. In the 19th century, there
were also costly crises such as that of 1890-1891, which caused a fall in GDP of
13.5 per cent.
Furthermore, Argentina seems to be vulnerable to crises originated else-
where, not only to widespread crises such as that of 1929-1930, but also to
regional crises such as the Tequila, with epicentre in Mexico in 1994.
Are there, as sustained by Juan Bautista Alberdi in the introductory quote,
regularities in the Argentine crises? Are these crises best explained by
domestic inconsistencies or by external factors? This paper addresses these
questions. To answer them, we first construct a Market Turbulence Index
(henceforth MTI) to identify and classify crises in three categories: very deep
or crashes, deep and mild. The index was computed from annual data from
as early as 1825 to 1913 and from monthly observations from 1914 to 2002.
Second, we study the determinants of Argentina’s currency crises using
non-parametric techniques, graphic analysis and bivariate and multivariate
logit models. These methodologies were previously adopted in the literature
for a large number of economies but over shorter time spans.
Our paper contributes to the existing literature on the economic history of
Argentine currency crises in two important aspects. On one hand, our study
covers 177 years, most of Argentina’s life as an independent nation. Notice
that Argentina declared its independence in 1816 and started the so-called
national organization period in 1862 under the Bartolome´ Mitre adminis-
tration. Unlike earlier papers that select a given crisis or a limited set of crises
and analyse its causes and consequences, we examine the entire record of a
country that suffered recurrent crises throughout its history, and look for
regularities in its main macroeconomic variables.
On the other hand, we put together several disperse data sets to assemble
the MTI from 1825, thus extending (only for Argentina) the Eichengreen
and Bordo’s (2002) study that covers the period 1885-1998 with annual
data. Moreover, to the best of our knowledge this is the first paper to identify
and categorize Argentine currency crises from monthly data from 1914,
which allows us to identify the beginning, the peak and the end of each
episode accurately.
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 surveys the
theoretical and empirical literature on currency crises. Section 3 is dedicated
to the identification and categorization of Argentine currency crises by
means of an MTI for the period 1825-2002. Section 4 shows the results from
non-parametric tests, graphic analysis and bivariate and multivariate logit
regressions. Section 5 concludes.
2. REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
Several theoretical models have been developed to explain currency crises.
Traditional models, inspired in the influential work of Krugman (1979), showed
how basic inconsistencies between fiscal policy and exchange rate commitment
lead to the collapse of the currency peg. In Krugman’s paper, the budget deficit
is fully monetized and economic agents get rid of the excess money supply by
exchanging domestic money for foreign reserves of the central bank. When
reserves fall to a critical threshold a speculative attack takes place, forcing
authorities to abandon parity. Policy inconsistency may only be sustained while
the central bank has sufficiently large amounts of reserves.
In the so-called first-generation model of currency crises, economic
agents’ expectations are not assumed to affect authorities’ policy decisions on
fiscal and monetary issues. Quite the opposite, second-generation models,
associated with the work of Obstfeld (1986, 1994), emphasize the role of
economic agents’ expectations on government policy decisions. These mod-
els allow for self-fulfilling crises: any outcome can emerge from the inter-
action between agents’ expectations and government decisions, giving rise to
multiple equilibriums.
In second-generation models authorities decide whether to adopt, defend
or abandon an exchange rate regime depending on costs and benefits, which
in turn are influenced by agents’ expectations. Hence, there are various
reasons that can lead a government to devaluate its currency. For example, a
government might be tempted to devaluate if facing a large debt burden
denominated in local currency or to alleviate social pressures in a context of
high unemployment and rigid wages. Another important difference between
these two approaches is that the moment of the depletion of reserves can be
anticipated in first-generation models, while in second-generation models
the timing is undetermined, so it can happen unexpectedly, even if funda-
mentals remain unchanged.
As first- and second-generation models failed to capture important
aspects of the 1997 Southeast Asian crisis, the third-generation models of
currency crises arose. Financial intermediaries have a central role in these
crises. They borrow short-term money, often in foreign currency, and lend
that money long term in local denominated currency. The market euphoria
leads to excessive lending, which in turn causes asset price inflation.
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When crises burst, asset prices fall and the mismatch insolvency of inter-
mediaries becomes evident.
Recently, Calvo (1998) and Calvo and Reinhart (2000) put forward the
sudden stop theory of currency crises. They argue that massive reversal in
capital inflows generates currency crises in emerging economies. The rever-
sions generally happen in countries that experienced heavy capital inflows
and, consequently, considerable current account deficits. To face this sudden
capital outflow, governments spend reserves — which increases financial
vulnerability — and finally devalue their currency. The resulting reverse in
current account deficit impacts on economic activity and employment.
The empirical literature on currency crises has followed two different
paths. On one hand, a large number of studies relied on cross-country evi-
dence to determine which theoretical model best describes a particular crisis
or a given group of crises. On the other hand, several papers were dedicated
to case studies, which allow for more qualitative and detailed discussion.
By definition, a currency crisis is a speculative attack against a currency
whether successful (if it ends up in devaluation) or not. However, empirical
studies require a testable definition of currency crises. Eichengreen et al.
(1994) provide a useful MTI that serves to identify currency crises. MTI
captures not only successful speculative attacks but also several turbulent
situations in which authorities defend the currency against the attack by
spending foreign reserves and/or increasing the rate of interest. The MTI is
defined as the weighted sum of three variables: the growth rate of exchange
rates, the growth rate of international reserves and the domestic interest rate.
These variables result from an index of market pressure in the monetary
market developed by Girton and Roper (1977).
Several cross-country studies find that the majority of crises in emerging
countries are explained by domestic policy inconsistencies and also assign
an important role to external shocks in triggering crises. For example,
Eichengreen et al. (1994), studying 22 developed and emerging countries,
find significant differences in the behaviour of macro variables before the
speculative attack in emerging economies, but no differences in developed
countries. They conclude that crises in emerging countries respond to first-
generation models, while those in developed countries to second generation
ones. Similarly, Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) use a sample of 20 countries
(mostly emerging) from 1970 to mid-1995, covering 76 currency crises and
26 banking crises to analyse the link between banking and currency crises. They
find ample evidence of weak and deteriorating fundamentals in both types of
crises, which allow them to rule out the self-fulfilling explanation. Edwards
(1989, 1993) examines the behaviour of macroeconomic variables in cases
where devaluation took place in comparison to a non-devaluation control group
for the period 1948-1971 and 1962-1982. He concludes that before devaluation,
international reserves decline, real exchange rates become overvalued and
fiscal policies are excessively expansionary. Kaminsky (2006) contributes with
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more evidence sustaining the importance of fundamentals in currency crises.
In her investigation of the determinants of contagion and sudden stops during
the 1990s in Mexico, Thailand and Russia, she presents evidence that trans-
mission of crises across countries and capital inflow reversals tend to occur in
economies with financial fragility and current account problems.
On the contrary, Sachs et al. (1996), studying the 1994 Mexican crisis, find
some elements of contagion and self-fulfilling panic. Traditional explana-
tions relying on current account deficits, fiscal policy stances and the size of
the capital inflows are not supported by their evidence.
On the other hand, most of the empirical studies exploring the nature of
the 1997 Asian crisis stress the fragility of the financial sector as the key
factor, supporting the emergence of another model, called third generation
(see Burnside et al. 1998; Corsetti et al. 1998; Chang and Velasco 1998). In
third-generation crises, we should observe important differences in variables
related to the financial system (deposit, money, money multiplier) before,
during and after a crisis.
The recent 2008-2009 crisis has focused attention on the relationship
between credit growth and crises. Schularick and Taylor (2012) present
evidence for the strong increase in financial leverage in the second half of the
20th century as shown by a decoupling of money and credit aggregates. They
study the behaviour of money, credit, and macroeconomic indicators over
the long run based on a historical data set for fourteen developed countries
over the years 1870-2008 and find that credit growth is a great predictor of
financial crises. This finding is consistent with the results obtained by
Gourinchas and Obstfeld (2012) for a panel of advanced and emerging
economies covering the 2007-2009 global crisis and post-1973 crises. They
conclude that the two most robust and significant predictors of crises in
general, for emerging and advanced economies alike, are domestic credit
growth and real currency appreciation. Moreover, those emerging economies
that avoided leverage booms during the 2000s were also most likely to avoid
the worst effects of the 21st century’s first global crisis.
2.1. Empirical research on Argentina
Case studies on Argentine crises also find evidence sustaining the role of
fundamentals. Early inquiries, mainly descriptive, associated with the names
of Terry (1893) and Wirth (1893) appeared after the crisis of 1890. Some
years later, Prebisch (1921) tried to find regularities in Argentine crises since
1823. Studies using modern instruments came in the 1980s. Cumby and van
Wijnbergen (1989), in their investigation of the crawling peg experience
during the 1980s, suggest that crises were generated by inconsistency of
exchange rate policy with domestic credit policy. Likewise, Della Paolera
and Taylor (1999, 2000) confirm the importance of fiscal links in the 1929
crisis, although they also stress other factors, like poor banking sector design.
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Bordo and Vegh (2002) also point at public sector behaviour when analysing
the early 19th century Argentinean experience of high inflation. They empha-
size the increasing problems in accessing world capital markets because of
Argentina’s earlier default and its inadequate tax structure based on trade taxes,
which were subject to disruption in periods of blockades and war. According to
these authors, both constraints prevailed because of the unwillingness of the
dominant political group, the ranchers, to allow themselves to be taxed.
Since the 2001-2002 episode, there has been a renewed interest in
Argentine crises. Calvo et al. (2002) identify domestic vulnerabilities as
playing a crucial role in magnifying the sudden stop effect of the 1998
Russian crisis. Saxton (2003) sustains that the 2001-2002 crisis was not
caused by market failures, but was the result of bad economic policies.
Very few papers have pooled together Argentine crises to study their
determinants. Choueiri and Kaminsky (1999) examine several crises in the
period 1975-1999, finding evidence of contagion in those crises, which in turn
were aggravated by inconsistent monetary and exchange rate policies. Veigel
(2004) analyses three major episodes: the crises of 1890, 1980 and 2001, con-
cluding that both technological and fundamental political changes influenced
the nature and consequences of each crisis, despite the fact that the constraints
faced by Argentina in each circumstance were essentially unchanged.
Della Paolera et al. (2003) also investigate the macroeconomic performance
of Argentina over a long period but rather than focusing on crises, they
examine each of the thirty-three administrations from 1853 to 1999 by means
of two indices. The first one, called the Classical Macroeconomic Pressure
Index, aggregates inflation, devaluation and interest rates, together with
annual estimates of changes in the level of economic activity (output growth).
This is a version of the Market Pressure Index used in this paper (see Section
3) to identify crises. The other index, called the Fiscal Pressure Index, includes
the ratios of public debt to GDP and to exports, the ratio of primary deficit
to revenues and debt service, and the real interest rate faced by Argentina
(a proxy for country risk) adjusted by the increase in the level of activity
(an adjustment to control for the explosiveness of the debt to GDP ratio).
3. IDENTIFYING AND CATEGORIZING CURRENCY CRISES
We identify and categorize Argentina’s currency crises using an index of
speculative attacks. The procedure involves two steps. First, we compute an
MTI for period t as
MTIt ¼
e^t
se^
 R^t
sR^
þ i^t
si^
where the symbol 4 represents the growth rate of the variable, e is the exchange
rate, R stands for international reserves, i is the domestic interest rate
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denominated in local currency (pesos) and se^; sR^; si^ are the standard devia-
tions of the growth rate of the exchange rate, international reserves and
domestic interest rate, respectively4. Notice that MTI is weighted by the inverse
of the respective standard deviation to prevent the most volatile component
dominating the movements of the index5. It is worth mentioning that crises
determinations were quite robust to different weighting schemes.
The objective of the index is to identify both successful speculative attacks
(that end up in currency depreciation) and speculative attacks that are suc-
cessfully warded-off by the authorities. Otherwise, the MTI would suffer
from selectivity bias. How do monetary authorities defend against spec-
ulative attacks? The standard way is to increase interest rates and spend
reserves. This is captured by the MTI (see Figures 1A and 1B).
FIGURE 1A
MARKET TURBULENCE INDEX (MTI) (ARGENTINA 1825-1913: ANNUAL DATA)
Source: see text.
4 We compute MTI considering only freely fluctuating exchange rates. During the lapses of
foreign exchange market intervention, we compute either exchange rates for financial operations
(if multiple exchange rates were in force) or black market exchange rates. This is the only way for
MTI to capture speculative attacks.
5 The coefficients of correlation between MTI components for annual and monthly data are
displayed in the Appendix.
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Our MTI specification differs slightly from previous papers. We include
the rate of change of the nominal interest rate to deal with the inflationary
process Argentina experienced over several decades. This long-lasting infla-
tionary process implied a high and volatile domestic interest rate, hence
other specifications such as the level of the domestic interest rate or the
difference between domestic and international rate proved to be inadequate
to capture turbulent periods.
The second step for determination and classification of currency crises
requires imposing a set of criteria to distinguish tranquil periods from the
diverse categories of speculative attacks. Most researchers construct bands
based on the moments of the MTI distribution, mainly mean (m) and stan-
dard deviation (s). Thus, whenever the MTI is greater than the mean plus k
standard deviations, a «signal» of turbulence is identified. Depending on the
number of standard deviations, a signal is categorized as mild, deep or very
deep. Other authors prefer the moments of each component of the index
(Moreno 1995). The simplest criterion is an absolute cut-off as proposed by
Frankel and Rose (1996).
Due to data limitations, we compute MTI from 1823 to 1913 with annual
observations and from 1914 to 2002 with monthly figures. This restriction
not only affects the accuracy of crisis identification in the early years but also
forces us to establish different sorting criteria for annual and monthly series.
FIGURE 1B
MARKET TURBULENCE INDEX (MTI) (ARGENTINA 1914-2002: MONTHLY DATA)
Source: see text.
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With annual data, we arbitrarily classified an episode as a «deep crisis» when
the MTI exceeded m plus one and a half standard deviations in a given year.
If MTI is greater than m plus two s, we say that the crisis is «very deep» or a
crash and if MTI only exceeds its mean value in one s, we term that episode
as «mild».
3.1. Criteria to identify and categorize crises
We impose the following criteria to identify and categorize crises from
monthly data. If MTI is greater than the mean value plus three s we consider
that episode as a very deep crisis, but if the MTI is greater than m plus two s,
we call it a «deep crisis». Finally, if MTI exceeds its mean value by one and a
half s, the episode is considered «mild». We require at least two consecutive
months with MTI greater than m plus k s to consider that episode as a signal.
The remaining events are termed as «non-crisis» or tranquil times. Table 1
summarizes these criteria.
We exclude hyperinflation episodes (1976 and 1989) from the estimation
of the moments so that inflationary data do not distort the bands and to avoid
the incorrect exclusion of crisis episodes that could appear as tranquil times
when compared with hyperinflation periods. To determine the boundaries of
a given crisis and to refrain from including the same crisis twice, we require
at least 6 months with no signals.
The MTI was computed for six sub-periods in order to keep its variance
relatively homogeneous. Sub-periods were chosen considering structural
breaks resulting from political and economic events6,7. As shown in Table 2,
there are remarkable differences between sub-periods.
It is worth remarking that the terms «very deep», «deep» and «mild» refer
to the sub-period considered and are not intended as an absolute qualifica-
tion for the whole period. The sub-periods were the following:
(a) 1825-1861: from President Rivadavia’s Administration to National
Organization (President Mitre Administration).
(b) 1862-1913: from the Mitre Administration to World War I.
(c) 1914-1945: from World War I to World War II8.
(d) 1946-1975: from the first to third President Pero´n Administration.
6 We also identified crisis episodes by generating confidence bands recursively for the whole
period. The results of both procedures are quite similar (see Appendix).
7 Computing performance indices for sub-periods identified using political events is also the
approach taken by della Paolera et al. (2003). Since their purpose is to rank the macroeconomic
performance of different administrations from 1853 to 1999, their sub-periods correspond to each
administration.
8 Based on univariate analysis and unit roots techniques, Sanz Villaroya (2004) determines
three phases of long-run growth for Argentina. The first goes from 1875 to 1913, the second from
1914 to 1974 and the third from 1975 to 2000.
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(e) 1976-1991: from the first to second hyperinflation.
(f) 1992-2002: Convertibility years.
The President Mitre administration, dubbed the beginning of the «national
organization», marked the first structural break. From independence in
1816 to 1861 provinces led by local bosses (caudillos) were defining pro-
vinces and national boundaries as well as their economic and political
organization through several internal and external wars.
Mitre was the first president to govern all provinces including the
powerful Province of Buenos Aires. The sub-period that spans from the Mitre
administration in 1862 to 1913 was characterized by high rates of growth (an
annual average of 5.2 per cent), huge immigration waves and high capital
TABLE 1
CRITERIA TO CLASSIFY CRISES
Annual data Monthly data
Criteria Classification Criteria Classification
MTIt,m1sMTI Non-crisis MTIt,m1sMTI Non-crisis
m1sMTI,MTIt,m1 1.5sMTI Mild m1sMTI,MTIt,m1 2sMTI Mild
m1 1.5sMTI,MTIt,m1 2sMTI Deep m1 2sMTI,MTIt,m1 3sMTI Deep
MTIt.m1 2sMTI Very deep MTIt.m1 3sMTI Very deep
MTI5market turbulence index.
Note: m and sMTI stands for the average MTI and its standard deviation in each sub-period,
respectively.
Source: see text.
TABLE 2
MTI STATISTICS
Period Average Standard deviation
1825-1861* 0.69 1.39
1862-1913* 0.12 1.42
1914-1945 20.03 0.35
1946-1975 0.19 1.51
1976-1990 1.05 3.70
1991-2002 0.20 1.79
MTI5market turbulence index.
Note: *Annual data.
We reject the null hypothesis of equality of variances by means of the Levene test.
Source: see text.
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inflows. This 52-year sub-period is considered Argentina’s golden years. It
was a period, however, which was struck by one of most severe episodes in
the country’s history: the 1890 crisis.
The two World Wars were also landmarks in the economic history of
Argentina. The 32 years from 1914 to 1945 were transition years. The country
passed from an open economy — the openness rates were the highest in its
history — to a rather closed one, and the government changed its role from
scarce regulation to high intervention, particularly after the Great Depres-
sion. The end of World War I implied the beginning of a new economic world
order that confirmed the leading role of the United States substituting the
United Kingdom, a major partner of Argentina. This period includes the first
coup d’etat in 1930, which opened a dark period of interruptions of the
constitutional order.
The fourth sub-period opens with the first administration of Juan Pero´n,
a major protagonist in the 20th century, and ends with the military coup d’
e´tat against Marı´a Estela Martı´nez, his third wife and Vice President who
succeeded him after his death, in 1974. The Pero´n administration was
characterized by high intervention in the economy, particularly in the price
system. He obtained rapid industrialization by altering the relative price of
agricultural vs. industrial goods and carried out expansive fiscal policies
financed by international reserves, the social security system and increasingly
inflationary taxes. This sub-period features the alternation between demo-
cratic governments and military coups d’ e´tat in 1955 (which removed Pero´n),
1962 (which removed President Frondizi), 1966 (which removed President
Illia) and 1976 (which removed Martı´nez). During this period, the economy
remained mostly closed and its fiscal policy disordered under both democratic
and military governments. After Pero´n’s death in 1974, the fiscal situation was
out of control and the first hyperinflationary process, known as «rodrigazo»,
started. The chaotic economic and political situation ended with the last coup
d’etat against Estela Martı´nez.
The fifth period covers 21 years from the first to the second hyperinflation
processes. It began with the last military irruption in March 1976 (Junta
Militar) and finished after President Alfonsı´n’s resignation. This particularly
tumultuous period was characterized by outrageous fiscal deficits, high
inflation, null economic growth and two hyperinflationary processes. The de
facto government, as well as Alfonsı´n’s democratic administration, tried
unsuccessfully to make economic reforms mainly directed at stopping
inflation. In 1988, inflation went completely out of control and in March
1989 the country suffered the second hyperinflation, which caused chaos and
signalled the final collapse of the closed-economy approach.
The last period begins and ends with the so-called Convertibility Plan, a
currency board system that tied the peso to the U.S. dollar. This period was
characterized by price stabilization, economic growth, high external indebted-
ness and important market-oriented reforms. In December 2001, in a chaotic
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economic and political situation, a general strike and protest resulted in the
resignation of President De la Ru´a. Three presidents followed in less than two
weeks. One of them, Rodriguez Saa´, decided to default on the government debt.
Finally, Congress chose Duhalde in 2002 to serve the rest of former president’s
term. His first measure was to put an end to the convertibility system.
3.2. Banks as financial agents of the government
Before the creation of the Central Bank of Argentina in 1935, we compute
the depreciation of the currency issued by different banks that operated as
financial agents of the government9: (a) from 1823 to 1826: Banco de Des-
cuentos; (b) from 1826 to 1836: Banco Nacional de las Provincias Unidas del
Rı´o de la Plata; (c) from 1836 to 1854: Casa de la Moneda; (d) from 1854 to
1861: Banco de la Provincia and Casa de Moneda; (e) from 1862 to 1872:
Banco de la Provincia de Buenos Aires (and Exchange Office); (f) from 1873
to 1887: Banco Nacional; (g) from 1891 to 1935: Banco de la Nacio´n
Argentina and Caja de Conversio´n.
These banks of issue defended their peg from speculative attacks in the
way anticipated by the theory. Even more, when banks could not defend
parity generally due to the excess supply of bank notes to finance public
expenditures, government declared inconvertibility, but always under the
promise of returning to it.
Notice also that before the law of monetary unification in 1881 (Law
No. 1130), there were many currencies circulating in the Argentine territory.
Nonetheless, the preeminence and influence of Buenos Aires over the rest of
the provinces was undisputable (see Gelman 2008).
3.3. The classification of crises
We identified twenty-four crises throughout 177 years of history.
Six crises were rated as «very deep», twelve as «deep» and seven as «mild».
Tables 3A and 3B shows the details. Interestingly, the number and magnitude
of the crises increases over time.
The twenty-four crises implied 42 crises years. That is, 24 per cent of the
177 years under analysis were crisis years, which meant 1 crisis year every
4 years. According to our index, the most turbulent period of Argentina’s
history was 1976-1990, not only because it registered four crises in 14 years,
but also because nine of those years (or 64 per cent of the period) were crisis
years (see Table 4).
9 Notice that for our definition of currency crises to be valid, we do not need a central bank. We
just need a bank operating as a financial agent of the government that defends the peg of the
currency.
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TABLE 3A
CRISIS CHARACTERISTICS: 1825-1913 (ANNUAL DATA)
Crisis
Exchange rate International reserves MTI
Crisis
type
Trough Peak
Rate of
growth
(%)
Peak Trough
Rate of
growth
(%) MTI.2s MTI.1.5s MTI.s MTI.0.5s$/U$S Year $/U$S Year
Millions
of peso
papel Year
Millions
of peso
papel Year
1826/27 1 1825 3.53 1827 271.7 2 Very
deep
1829/30 3.13 1828 7.13 1830 256.1 1 1 Deep
1839/40 9.19 1838 23.33 1840 260.6 1 1 Deep
1846 15.55 1845 22.66 1846 231.4 1 Mild
1876 25.0 1875 26.44 1876 25.4 130,900 1875 42,700 1876 267.4 1 1 Mild
1885 1 1884 1.37 1885 227.0 200,000 1884 427,500 1885 113.8 1 1 Deep
1889/91 1.35 1887 3.74 1891 263.9 172,000 1887 122,750 1891 228.6 3 1 2 Very
deep
MTI5market turbulence index.
Source: see text.
TABLE 3B
CRISIS CHARACTERISTICS: 1914-2002 (MONTHLY DATA)
Crisis
Exchange rate International reserves Interest rate
Trough Peak
Rate of
growth (%)
Peak Trough
Rate of
growth (%)
Trough Peak
Rate of
growth (%)$/U$S Month $/U$S Month
Millions
of U$S Month
Millions
of U$S Month % Month % Month
1914 2,351 Mar-14 2,368 May-14 20.72 232.1 Apr-14 196.39 Jul-14 215.39 7.50 Apr-14 8.75 Aug-14 16.7
1920/21 2,330 Apr-20 3,454 Jul-21 232.54 470.6 Jul-20 470.6 May-21 0.00 7.38 Oct-20 8.13 Apr-21 10.2
1929/31 2,375 Jan-29 4,260 Oct-31 244.25 502.6 Jan-29 256.9 Feb-32 248.88 6.13 Dec-28 7.87 May-31 28.4
1937/38 3,291 Jun-37 3,903 Apr-38 215.68 476.4 Jun-37 343.1 Apr-38 227.99 5.14 Oct-37 5.75 Jan-39 11.9
1948/49 475 Apr-48 1,650 Nov-49 271.21 3,737 Feb-48 2,067 Jul-49 244.69
1951 1,374 Jun-50 2,950 Sep-51 253.42 2,689 Dec-50 1,866 Dec-51 230.61
1958 3,720 Dec-57 7,350 Oct-58 249.39 461,120 May-57 101,270 Oct-58 278.04
1962 8,420 Dec-61 14,840 Nov-62 243.26 497,765 Aug-61 120,865 Oct-62 275.72
1964/65 14,040 May-64 28,570 Jul-65 250.86 321,365 May-64 117,180 Jun-65 263.54
1971 41,750 Feb-71 97,750 Nov-71 257.29 743,825 Oct-71 194,289 Jun-72 273.88
1975/76 14 Jun-74 333.5 Mar-76 295.80 1,536,531 May-74 293,346 Aug-75 280.91
1981/82 1,986.5 Dec-80 61,568.2 Nov-82 296.77 7,343.891 Jul-80 2,425.136 Nov-82 266.98 4.31 Oct-80 10.82 Jul-81 151.04
1983/
84/85
94,650 May-83 9,520,454.6 Aug-85 299.01 3,244.84 Jan-82 973.53 Feb-85 270.00 10.00 May-83 31.40 May-85 214.00
1987 8,951.0526 Jun-86 143,100 Sep-88 293.74 3,718.56 May-86 958.39 Aug-87 274.23 4.20 Jun-86 19.30 Jul-88 359.52
1989/
90/91
143,100 Sep-88 98,790,000 May-91 299.86 2,652.47 Nov-88 898.91 Jan-90 266.11 8.35 Sep-88 83.20 Jun-89 896.41
1995 1 Dec-94 1 Mar-95 0.00 9,967.07 Nov-94 5,958.6 Apr-95 240.22 0.60 Oct-94 1.50 Apr-95 150.00
2001/02 1 May-01 3.69 Nov-02 272.87 27,547 Sep-00 9,031 Oct-02 267.22 0.58 Aug-00 4.86 Jul-02 737.93
Crisis
Crisis breadth MTI
Crisis typeBeginning End # of months MTI.3s MTI.2s MTI.1.5s MTI.s MTI. 1/2s
1914 May-14 Jul-14 3 0 1 1 0 1 Deep
1920/21 Jul-20 May-21 11 0 0 0 2 4 Mild
1929/31 Mar-29 Dec-31 22 1 6 4 3 5 Very deep
1937/38 May-37 Mar-38 10 0 0 0 3 5 Mild
1948/49 Mar-48 Nov-49 16 1 1 2 1 2 Deep
1951 Jan-51 Aug-51 8 0 1 0 2 1 Mild
1958 Jan-58 Oct-58 10 1 1 2 1 2 Deep
1962 Jan-62 Oct-62 10 1 1 0 0 5 Deep
1964/65 Jun-64 Jun-65 13 0 0 3 0 5 Mild
1971 Jun-71 Jul-72 14 0 2 1 2 7 Deep
1975/76 Jul-74 Mar-76 21 2 4 2 5 5 Very deep
1981/82 Dec-80 Nov-82 24 1 1 2 6 1 Deep
1983/84/85 Jul-83 Apr-85 22 0 1 5 4 3 Deep
1987 Aug-86 Jun-88 23 0 1 3 3 7 Deep
1989/90/91 Jan-89 Feb-91 26 7 2 1 0 1 Very deep
1995 Dec-94 Mar-95 4 0 2 2 0 0 Deep
2001/02 Oct-00 Oct-02 25 8 1 2 3 5 Very deep
MTI5market turbulence index.
Note: The rate of growth of exchange rates and international reserves were computed from a peak to trough, considering the behaviour of these variables 6 months before and
after the signal given by the MTI announces the beginning and end of the crisis.
Source: see text.
TABLE 3B (Cont.)
Our results differ from those obtained by Eichengreen and Bordo (2002)
for Argentina. They identified crises for twenty-one countries from 1883 to
1971 and fifty-six countries from 1972 to 1998 by computing MTI relative to a
centre country. Comparing the same period (1885-1998), we identify eighteen
crises, four more than Eichengreen and Bordo. They failed to recognize the
deep crisis of 1914 and the following mild crises: 1920-1921, 1937-1938 and
1964-1965. On the other hand, Eichengreen and Bordo identified a currency
crisis in 1908, after the 1907 U.S. banking crisis, and another in 1967 while our
MTI only registers small turbulences that do not qualify as mild crises.
We conjecture that most of the difference between their dating and ours is
explained by the periodicity of data: we use monthly data while they relied on
annual data. Yearly observations may hide some speculative attacks, espe-
cially unsuccessful ones. Pressure against a pegged currency can escalate
quickly and be repelled by increasing interest rates or foreign exchange
market intervention (spending reserves) within a year or even shorter peri-
ods, therefore the average behaviour of interest rates and international
reserves over a year may not reveal the intensity of speculative pressures. Our
monthly observations add precision to the identification of the beginning and
end of each episode and, hence, help compute the span of each crisis as
shown in Table 3B. This is a substantial improvement over Eichengreen and
Bordo (2002).
According to our criteria to categorize Argentine crises, we considered those
that took place in 1826-1827, 1889-1891, 1929-1931, 1975-1976, 1989-1991,
2001-2002 as very deep. Correspondingly we classified the following episodes as
TABLE 4
SUMMARY OF CRISES
Period
Years
(1)
Number
of crises
(2)
Number
of crisis
years (3)
Crisis
years as
% of total
years
(3)/(1)
GDP
growth
(annual
average
in %)
Type of crisis
Very
deep Deep Mild
1825-1861 36 4 7 19 2.5 1 2 1
1862-1913* 51 3 5 10 5.4 1 1 1
1914-1945 31 4 8 25 3.1 1 1 2
1946-1975 29 7 10 34 3.8 1 4 2
1976-1990 14 4 9 64 0.4 1 3 –
1991-2002 11 2 3 27 2.1 1 1 –
Total 177 24 42 24 3.3 6 12 6
Source: see text.
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deep crises: 1829-1830, 1839-1840, 1885, 1914, 1948-1949, 1958, 1962, 1971,
1981-1982, 1983-1985, 1987 and 1995. Finally, we termed the events that took
place in 1846, 1876, 1920-1921, 1937-1938, 1951 and 1964-1965 as mild.
4. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
How did the Argentine economy perform in the neighbourhood of crises?
Are there regularities in the behaviour of key macroeconomic variables,
namely, public expenditures, fiscal deficits, imports, GDP, terms of trade
(TOT), real exchange rates, domestic interest rates, monetary aggregate M2
and its monetary multiplier, bank deposits, external debt, international
reserves and LIBOR, in the vicinity of these extreme episodes? Did the
Argentine crises respond to the predictions of any particular theory?
To answer these questions we carried out the following empirical strategy10.
First, we evaluated non-parametric tests to determine whether macroeconomic
variables behave significantly differently in crises and non-crisis periods.
Second, we performed graphical analysis to learn how these macro variables
behave before, during and after crises. Finally, we estimated logistic bivariate
and multivariate regression models to assess the significance of variables
representing different crisis models. Due to data limitations, empirical analysis
is restricted to the period 1865-2002.
We introduce macroeconomic variables that are indicators of currency
crises. Following Kaminsky (2006), these indicators are grouped according
to the symptoms which the various generation models focus on. Expansive
fiscal policy or excess real M1 balances may be signalling first-generation
model of crises. Exports, imports, real exchange rate, TOT may be indicators
of second-generation model of crises. On the other hand, third-generation
model of crises may be related to financial sector variables, such us domestic
credit/GDP, M2/reserves, deposits, among others. Sudden stop models imply
a capital inflow before crises followed by a considerable fall afterwards,
so we should see world real interest rates and foreign exchange reserves.
Lastly, sovereign debt crises are related to over-indebted countries, an
excessively high debt to imports or exports ratio may be signalling these
types of crises.
4.1. Non-parametric tests
We carried out the Kruskal–Wallis test and the Kolmogorov–Smirnov
test for fifteen macroeconomic variables proposed by the theories at stake.
The null hypothesis is that the population (Kruskal–Wallis) or distribution
10 We followed the approaches of Eichengreen et al. (1994) and Frankel and Rose (1996).
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(Kolmogorov–Smirnov) of each variable does not differ significantly during
crisis and non-crisis periods11. The results are presented in Table 5. Except
for the rate of growth of TOT and external debt to imports, we reject the
null for all variables12. These results are in line with those obtained by
Eichengreen et al. (1994), who found significant differences in a group of
TABLE 5
KRUSKAL–WALLIS AND KOLMOGOROV–SMIRNOV TESTS FOR CRISIS AND
NON-CRISIS PERIODS (ARGENTINA 1865-2002: ANNUAL DATA)
Variable Kruskal–Wallis Kolmogorov–Smirnov
Fiscal deficit/GDP 6.663*** 0.281**
Public expenditure/GDP 10.574*** 0.355***
Imports growth 13.381*** 0.393***
GDP growth 9.693*** 0.314***
TOT growth 1.285 0.147
RER 4.605** 0.354**
Exchange rate overvaluation 3.027* 0.331***
Domestic interest rate 8.053*** 0.311***
M2 growth 15.194** 0.354***
M2 multiplier growth 2.849* 0.307**
Bank deposits growth 23.160*** 0.479***
External debt growth 5.916** 0.322**
External debt/exports 2.471* 0.227*
External debt/imports 2.105 0.237*
International reserves growth 7.631*** 0.348***
LIBOR 5.544** 0.308***
TOT5 terms of trade; RER5 real exchange rate.
Notes: Values correspond to x2.
***Significant at 0.01; **Significant at 0.05; *Significant at 0.10.
M2 stands for monetary aggregate M2 (coins and notes in circulation plus short-term savings
deposits).
11 Both Kruskal–Wallis and Kolmogorov–Smirnov tests require independent variables, which
might not be the case here, so we take both tests as preliminary and not conclusive evidence.
12 There are also considerable differences in the mean values of most of the macroeconomic
variables in crisis and non-crisis periods (see Table 1A in Appendix).
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macroeconomic variables between crisis and non-crisis periods for emerging
economies but not for European countries. The fact that TOT growth does not
vary significantly in crisis and non-crisis periods indicates that unfavourable
international trade conditions not always result in a currency crisis.
4.2. Graphic analysis
Figure 2 shows movements in selected variables 2 years before and
2 years after each crisis13. For each crisis, we denote t as the peak of the crisis
and compute the average value of the variables for t22; t21; t; t1 1; t1 2.
The average is reported for all crises and for the sub-group of very deep crises
(dotted lines).
We observe that all the variables behave differently before, during and
after crises. For instance, Public Expenditure to GDP peaks during crises and
the trough is reached at t1 2 with an average fall of 11.4 per cent. In a similar
way, GDP growth reaches a peak 2 years before the beginning of the crisis (on
average 6 per cent) and the trough occurs during the crises (0.8 per cent on
average). The difference between peak and trough is 5.2 per cent on average.
Likewise, Imports Growth peaks, on average, two periods before crises and
the trough occurs during crises. Exchange rate overvaluation looks similar to
imports. The maximum value is reached at t22 (26.3) and the minimum
value during crises (220.8).
Deposits Growth reaches a maximum at t21 (13.2 per cent) and a
minimum during the crises, averaging 27.7 per cent. The ratio of External
debt to imports peaks at t with an average value of external debt of 4.4 times
Imports, while its trough occurs at t22 with a value of 1.98.
External conditions are also present in the explanation of crises. Changes
in the International Rate of Interest (LIBOR) reach a peak at t – 2 and a trough
at t11 (average values are 5.9 per cent and 24.5 per cent, respectively). For
emerging economies, the increase in the international interest rate is
important for two reasons. First, it helps to explain capital inflows and
outflows in emerging countries as pointed out by Calvo et al. (1996). Second,
it impacts on the service of external debt. An increase in the rate of interest is
associated with a worsening in fiscal accounts.
The rate of growth of TOT shows a different behaviour on average at
different moments of crises, reaching a peak two periods before crises begin
(5.4 per cent). The fall in TOT during crises (22.5 per cent) provides evidence
that adverse external conditions were present in most severe crises.
13 As Frankel and Rose (1996) emphasize, a graphical approach has clear advantages: (a) it
imposes no parametric structure on the data; (b) it makes only a few assumptions that are necessary
in inference statistics; and (c) it is often more accessible and informative than tables with estima-
tions of coefficients. This approach, however, also has disadvantages: it is informal and intrinsically
univariate.
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FIGURE 2
MACROECONOMIC VARIABLES BEHAVIOUR BEFORE, DURING AND AFTER
CRISES (1865-2002)
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4.3. Regression analysis
The non-parametric and graphical studies are intrinsically univariate so we
enriched and complemented them by means of multivariate analysis. In the
spirit of Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) and Kaminsky (2006), we estimate
early warning regression (see Table 5). We run logit models whose binary-
dependent variable takes the value 0 for non-crisis years, and 1 for crisis years.
The set of explanatory variables represents different models of crises. Public
expenditures as percentage of GDP corresponds to first-generation models of
currency crises; second-generation models are represented by the rate of
growth of Imports, the overvaluation in real exchange rate and the rate of
growth of TOT. The rate of growth of real Bank Deposits is included to capture
the effects of third-generation models and external debt as percentage of
imports represents sovereign debt models. LIBOR attempts to capture the
influence of sudden stop models. All explanatory variables were lagged once
to mitigate endogeneity14. We also carried out unit root tests to check for
stationarity of the variables. We found that most of them are integrated of
order 1, so we worked correspondingly with their rates of growth to achieve
stationarity.
Results of the logistic estimations are reported in Table 6. Columns 1 and 3
show the estimated coefficient of two alternative models, while columns 2
and 4 present the changes in variables (dy/dx). Since some of the explanatory
variables showed relatively high correlation among themselves, we were
unable to capture their joint effect. The second model only includes variables
that were statistically significant at usual levels in the first model, so we
dropped real exchange rate overvaluation (correlated with imports) and
LIBOR (correlated with the ratio of public expenditure to GDP).
We find that the probability of crisis rises as public expenditure (as per
cent of GDP) increases, meaning that those periods of expansive public
expenditure precede currency crises. Likewise, a worsening of the TOT
increases the probability of crises, confirming that unfavourable external
conditions can deteriorate a domestic economy via commercial channels.
The coefficient of Imports is positive and very significant, indicating that
periods with high levels of imports, which coincide with the intervals of
overvaluation of domestic currency, increase the risk of a currency crisis.
We also find that a fall in bank deposits anticipates a currency crisis:
people fearing a devaluation of domestic currency take their money out of
the banking system, to avoid or mitigate the expected loss. Similarly, the
positive and significant coefficient of external debt (as per cent of imports)
suggests that periods of high indebtedness (measured in relation to imports,
exports or its growth) increase the probability of crises. Finally, LIBOR has
the expected sign but it is not significant at usual levels.
14 The authors thank an anonymous referee for pointing this out.
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Since logit regression coefficients are not directly interpretable, we
compute the estimated changes in the probability of crisis in two different
situations: (a) for observed maximum and minimum values of the variables
TABLE 6
BIVARIATE LOGIT REGRESSION RESULTS
Dependent variable: Crisis (dummy5 1 if crisis years and 0 otherwise)
Observations: 136. Period: 1865-2002
Variables
Model 1 Model 2
Coefficient dy/dx Coefficient dy/dx
Public expenditure as % of GDP (t2 1) 0.133* 0.0201* 0.153* 0.024**
(0.082) (0.0114) (0.085) (0.012)
TOT growth (t2 1) 23.558** 20.558** 23.217* 20.511*
(1.86) (0.275) (1.917) (0.286)
Imports growth (t2 1) 0.019** 0.0031** 0.018*** 0.0029***
(0.006) (0.011) (0.006) (0.0009)
RER overvaluation (t2 1) 0.486 0.076
(0.422) (0.066)
Bank deposit growth (t2 1) 20.031** 20.0048** 20.026* 20.0042**
(0.016) (0.002) (0.015) (0.002)
Domestic credit as % of GDP (t2 1) 1.783* 0.281* 1.490 0.236
(1.1) (0.157) (1.06) (0.17)
External debt as % of imports (t2 1) 0.147** 0.023** 0.131* 0.021**
(0.016) (0.011) (0.073) (0.011)
Delta LIBOR (t2 1) 0.093 0.014
(0.194) (0.014)
Constant 23.49*** 23.39***
(0.987) (0.965)
Correctly classified 79% 80%
Wald x2 17.99 17.27
McFadden R2 0.155 0.145
Obs with Dep5 0 101 101
Obs with Dep5 1 35 35
TOT5 terms of trade; RER5 real exchange rate.
Note: Robust Standard errors below coefficient.
***Significant at 0.01; **Significant at 0.05; *Significant at 0.10.
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(see column 4 in Table 7) and (b) for the crisis of 1890 (see column 7 in
Table 7), keeping other variables at their means. In both cases figures are
obtained from the following equation:
Dp^ yi ¼ 1ð Þ ¼
ex0b^0 þ x1b^1 þþ xi
MAX b^iþþxkb^k
1 þ ex0b^0 þ x1b^1 þþ xMAX ib^iþþ xkb^k
 e
x0b^0 þ x1b^1 þþ xiMIN b^iþþ xkb^k
1 þ ex0b^0 þ x1b^1 þþ xMINib^iþþ xkb^k
The probability of crisis increases by 0.36 when public expenditure as
per cent of GDP goes from its minimum value (4.61) to its maximum (17),
keeping other explanatory variables at their means (see column 2). Similarly,
for the 1890 crisis, as public expenditure as per cent of GDP goes from 7.05 in
1888 to 12.59 in 1889, the probability of crisis increases by 0.16 (see column 7).
In Table 6 we also present the same exercise for all variables. It is worth
noting that the probability of crisis increases by 0.58 when all variables are
evaluated at their observed 1888-1889 values.
4.4. Multinomial logit regressions
We also performed multinomial logit regressions to capture the differ-
ential behaviour of variables in very deep crises, on one hand, and deep and
mild crises, on the other (see Table 7). We redefine our dependent variable,
TABLE 7
CHANGES IN THE PROBABILITY OF CRISES
Variables (X) (1)
Observed values Crisis of 1890
Min (2) Max (3)
Change in
probability
(4)
Observed
values at
1888 (5)
Observed
values at
1889 (6)
Change in
probability
(7)
Public expenditure
as % of GDP
4.61 17 0.36 7.05 12.59 0.16
TOT growth 20.36 0.43 20.01 0.12 20.31 0.25
Imports growth 263.01 153.13 0.74 6.97 75.34 0.29
Domestic credit as
% of GDP
20.14 0.58 20.00 0.22 0.16 0.00
Bank deposit
growth
256.40 50.61 20.52 44.90 21.31 0.08
External debt as %
of imports
0.25 15.01 0.43 0.69 0.70 0.00
0.74 0.58
TOT5 terms of trade.
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assigning the value of 0 to non-crisis periods, 1 for deep and mild crises, and
2 for very deep crisis episodes. We put forward three models. The first three
columns of Table 8 show the results for mild and deep crises, while the last
three those for very deep crises. The results of multivariate logistic estima-
tions strengthen those obtained with bivariate logistic models and give new
information regarding the impact of each explanatory variable in crisis
episodes of different intensities. We find that domestic conditions are very
important to explain mild and deep crises: public expenditure (as per cent of
GDP), imports growth, domestic credit (as per cent of GDP) and bank
deposits growth are very significant, while TOT are not. On the contrary,
TABLE 8
MULTIVARIATE LOGISTIC REGRESSION RESULTS
Dependent variable: Crisis (dummy5 2 if very deep crisis years;
1 if deep and mild crises and 0 otherwise)
Observations: 135. Period: 1865-2002
Variables
Mild and deep crises Very deep crises
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Public expenditure
as % of GDP (t2 1)
0.202* 0.208* 0.199** 0.098 0.0805 0.179*
(0.113) (0.113) (0.088) (0.111) (0.110) (0.110)
Imports growth
(t2 1)
0.018*** 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.0187** 0.017* 0.0135
(0.007) (0.0066) (0.0085) (0.0098) (0.009) (0.0103)
TOT growth
(t2 1)
22.192 21.65 22.127 25.985* 25.66* 25.717**
(1.973) (2.13) (2.250) (3.315) (2.925) (2.677)
RER overvaluation
(t2 1)
0.653 0.240
(0.472) (0.530)
Bank deposit growth
(t2 1)
20.0228** 20.0190* 20.0253* 20.0427 20.035 20.0434**
(0.0153) (0.0148) (0.0154) (0.028) (0.024) (0.0187)
Domestic credit as %
of GDP (t2 1)
2.942** 2.46** 20.218 0.356
(1.306) (1.26) (1.647) (1.589)
External debt as %
of imports (t2 1)
0.115 0.0977 0.149* 0.0162*
(0.098) (0.927) (0.09) (0.08)
Delta LIBOR (t2 1) 20.092 0.365
(0.226) (0.283)
Constant 24.649*** 24.538*** 23.634*** 23.714*** 23.497*** 23.987***
(1.415) (1.38) (0.997) (1.283) (1.19) (1.248)
Wald x2 28.83 22.68 21.73
McFadden R2 0.154 0.135 0.108
TOT5 terms of trade; RER5 real exchange rate.
Note: Robust standard errors below coefficient.
***Significant at 0.01; **Significant at 0.05; *Significant at 0.10.
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external circumstances (TOT growth and external debt) play a key role in
very deep crises, jointly with domestic conditions. In other words, very deep
crises are the result of a worsening of both external and domestic conditions,
while mild and deep crises are mostly explained by deterioration in domestic
variables.
These results are in line with Neumeyer and Perri’s (2005) study of
the Argentine business cycle. They consider two components of the domestic
real interest rate: the international interest rate and the country risk and
found that eliminating country risk lowers Argentine output volatility
by 27 per cent while stabilizing international interest rates lowers it by
less than 3 per cent.
5. CONCLUSIONS
Argentina’s crises have been the subject matter of numerous research
papers. Scholars have mainly focused on a particular crisis or group of crises
to obtain a deeper understanding of each episode. We take a different
approach, attempting to complement previous analyses. We identify and
categorize crises from 1825 to 2002 using an MTI and analyse them all
together by means of non-parametric and parametric techniques, looking for
regularities.
We identify twenty-four currency crises in 177 years, six of them con-
sidered very deep or crashes, twelve deep crises and six mild crises. Unlike
other papers that rely on annual observations to compute the MTI, we use
monthly data from 1914 to 2002, which allows us to identify the beginning,
the peak and the end of each episode with accuracy. The evidence from
non-parametric tests, containing Kruskal–Wallis and Kolmogorov–Smirnov
tests, graphic analysis and regression analysis, featuring bivariate logit
and multinomial logit regressions, suggests that domestic imbalances,
in particular fiscal mismanagement, played a major role in most of the crises.
Huge expansions in public expenditures as well as immoderate augments
in the debt to GDP ratio contribute to spur the probability of crisis. Likewise,
abrupt falls in the rate of growth of bank deposits, frequently linked to
domestic inconsistencies, were another key ingredient in Argentine crises.
We detect the presence of external factors in crashes. That is, very deep crises
are the result of unfavourable external and domestic conditions while
mild and deep crises are mostly explained by deterioration in domestic
variables.
This point should not be missed by policymakers since they can influence
and decide on domestic policies, but not on external conditions. Our results
not only reinforce recent evidence on the Argentine business cycles like the
Neumeyer and Perri’s (2005) study, but also support Alberdi’s old conjecture
on the causes of early Argentine crises.
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APPENDIX
TABLE 1A
MEAN VALUES OF KEY MACROECONOMIC VARIABLES (ARGENTINA 1865-2002)
Variable Total Crises
Deep
crises
Non-
crises
Rate of growth of external debt (%) 8.26 22.5 36.07 3.38
External debt/GDP 31.14 40.79 47.15 27.95
Rate of growth of imports (%) 7.91 25.37 29.76 12.42
Rate of growth of exports (%) 10.49 21.38 28.36 14.14
Rate of growth of international reserves (%) 49.9 24.14 216.5 66.74
Reserves/imports 0.80 0.61 0.61 0.857
LIBOR (%) 4.55 5.18 5.38 4.35
Rate of growth of monetary aggregate M2 (%) 3.22 26.41 210.76 7.12
Rate of growth of the multiplier of monetary
aggregate M2 (%)
0.69 22.09 25.26 1.817
Rate of growth of real total bank deposits (%) 9.35 29.10 212.58 14.83
Rate of growth of GDP (%) 3.46 0.95 20.84 4.23
Rate of growth of TOT (%) 0.86 21.37 21.21 1.55
Rate of growth of public expenditure (%) 8.11 8.91 13.26 7.83
Fiscal deficit/GDP 23.35 25.87 27.17 22.56
RER 1.50 1.97 2.02 1.35
Rate of interest (%) 1.83 3.89 3.93 1.16
TOT5 terms of trade; RER5 real exchange rate.
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TABLE 2A
COEFFICIENT OF CORRELATION BETWEEN MTI COMPONENTS (ANNUAL DATA)
Period: 1865-2002
Rate of growth (%)
Nominal
exchange rate
International
rserves
Rate of
interest
Nominal
exchange rate
1
Rate of growth (%) International
reserves
20.03807 1
Rate of interest 0.27284 20.04698 1
MTI5market turbulence index.
TABLE 2B
COEFFICIENT OF CORRELATION BETWEEN MTI COMPONENTS
(MONTHLY DATA)
Period: 1865-2002
Rate of growth (%)
Nominal
exchange rate
International
reserves
Rate of
interest
Nominal
exchange rate
1
Rate of growth (%) International
reserves
20.11921 1
Rate of interest 0.27036 20.09584 1
MTI5market turbulence index.
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FIGURE 1A
CRISIS DETERMINATION BASED ON RECURSIVE ESTIMATED BANDS
(ARGENTINA 1825-1913)
FIGURE 2A
CRISIS DETERMINATION BASED ON RECURSIVE ESTIMATED BANDS
(ARGENTINA 1914-2002)
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Source: see text
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DATA SOURCES
Considerable effort has been devoted to the construction of time series for
177 years. The MTI was computed using monthly data from 1914 to the present.
Exchange rates were taken from Va´zquez–Presedo (1971, 1976), A´mbito
Financiero (1984), FIEL (1989) and Ferreres (2005). To construct the interna-
tional reserves series we use data from Va´zquez–Presedo (1971, 1976), the
International Monetary Fund and the Memoria Annual of Banco Central de la
Repu´blica Argentina (BCRA). Interest rates were taken from Va´zquez–
Presedo (1971, 1976), Indicadores de Coyuntura of FIEL and Revista Economı´a
of BCRA. Monetary, fiscal and international trade variables were obtained from
Corte´s Conde (1989) and also from BCRA, Ministerio de Economı´a de la
Nacio´n, Va´zquez-Presedo, from Gerchunoff and Llach (2003) and from Ferreres
(2005). The following tables contain a detailed description of the original series
and the assembled series. Series are available upon request
DATA SOURCES AND DEFINITIONS (ANNUAL DATA)
Variable Period Definition Source
Nominal
exchange rate
1825-1884 Gold Premium Corte´s Conde
(1989)
Annual data 1882-1914 Price of gold peso (pesos papel) Va´zquez-
Presedo (1971)
Nominal
exchange rate
1820-1850 Price paid for one ounce of gold
on the Buenos Aires Stock
Exchange (monthly average)
Burgin (1975)
Monthly data 1826-1914 Exchange rate peso Fuerte -
pesos papel moneda corriente
A´lvarez (1929)
International
reserves
1854-1883 Gold stock in Banco Provincia
de Buenos Aires
Garrigos (1873)
Annual data 1883-1914 Gold and silver stock in the
banking system
della Paolera
(1988)
Interest rate and
annual data
1823-1854 and
1863-1914
Yield of the 6% bond of Fondos
pu´blicos nacionales
Corte´s Conde
(1989)
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DATA SOURCES AND DEFINITIONS (MONTHLY DATA)
Variable Period Definition Source
Nominal
exchange rate
1914-1984 Peso-US dollar exchange rate A´mbito Financiero (1984)
1984-2002 From 1984 to 2002: average of
daily data
FIEL (Various Issues) Data
base
From April to June 1982 and from
May 31, 1989 to December 11,
1989 Pesos-US dollar exchange
rate in Montevideo
From December 12, 1989: free
market
International
reserves
1914-1935 Gold stock in the currency board
(millions of gold pesos)
Va´zquez-Presedo (1976)
1936-1950 Value of gold and foreign
currency expressed in pesos
m$n in Buenos Aires
Banco Central de la Repu´blica
Argentina (Various issues)
1949-1956 Balance sheet Banco Central
de la Repu´blica Argentina
1957-1998 International reserves. Millions
of SDR
International Monetary Fund
(Various Issues) Data base
1998-2002 International Reserves Argentine
Central Bank (BCRA)
Ministerio de Economı´a de la
Nacio´n
Interest rate 1914-1939 Discount rate in private banks.
Average rate
Va´zquez-Presedo (1976)
1940-1945 Interest rates for 90-day deposits Suplemento Estadı´stico Banco
Central de la Repu´blica
Argentina (Various Issues)
1966-1996 Interest rates for 30-day deposits FIEL (Various Issues) Data base
1996-2002 Ministerio de Economı´a de la
Nacio´n
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VARIABLES USED IN THE REGRESSIONS (ANNUAL DATA)
Variable Period Source
Real GDP at market prices of 1993 1865-2002 Ferreres (2005)
National Public Administration
Expenditures
1865-2002
National Public Administration
Revenues
1865-2002
Consumer Price Index 19995 100 1865-2002
Exports FOB (US$) 1865-2002
Imports CIF (US$) 1865-2002
External public debt (US$) 1865-2002
Terms of trade 1865-2002
LIBOR 1865-2002 Bank of England
www.bankofengrand.co.uk/
Links/setframe.html
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